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ABSTRACT 
Cyprus suffers from a developing acute case of Balance Sheet Recession. This means 
that because of the excessive and quite unprecedented levels of private debt (3 to 4 
times the size of the country’s GDP) weighing on households and corporations, it is 
practically impossible for the country to overcome the recessionary effects of the 
austerity conditions that were imposed since the bail-in in 2013 and which still 
constitute the core of the Government policy. 
 
The article concludes that therefore the government should stand ready to have in 
place the institutions and provide for such fiscal measures which will mitigate and 
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Private debt is the problem 
Why the economic recovery of Cyprus remains an elusive and distant dream 
 
Cyprus suffers from a developing acute case of what Richard Koo (Koo, 2015) has 
coined as Balance Sheet Recession. This means that because of the excessive and 
quite unprecedented levels of private debt (3 to 4 times the size of the country’s GDP) 
weighing on households and corporations, it is practically impossible for the country 
to overcome the recessionary effects of the austerity conditions that were imposed 
since the bail-in in 2013 and which still constitute the core of the Government policy. 
To put it as simply as possible, companies and households are overwhelmed by debts 
which are almost impossible to repay. On the one hand, borrowers are encumbered 
with ever increasing interest and collaterals on their loans and on the other, income 
from economic activity is progressively becoming stagnant or decreasing. The twin 
effect of these is that the country, slowly but surely, is dragged into a long and severe 
recession. The economy is hence up against conditions of weak domestic demand and 
mostly, as a result of that, low capital investment. 
This situation poses two problems which impede the road to reconstruction and 
development. One is that, as the margins for dissaving are being exhausted, the 
conditions for investing in economically viable projects are becoming increasingly 
worse and secondly, but equally important, given the huge debts burdening the private 
sector, the ability to repay existing and new loans deteriorate to the point where new 
loans to stimulate the economy are neither demanded nor are, justifiably to some 
extent, being offered by the banks. Under normal economic conditions viability is far 
from a given. But when the lack of local consumer demand and risks encompassing 
the country, such as the huge public sector debt and the instability in our banking 
system are factored in, even with a clean slate (where the existing debts are not taken 
into account) it would be very difficult for other than export oriented projects, such as 
in tourism, to be viable. 
When economic conditions are adverse and the economic agents of the country are 
burdened with un-repayable loans (most showing negative net worth), then something 
has to give for economic development to take place and be sustainable. In such grim 
circumstances, there are only two possible ways forward. Doing nothing and hoping 
for the best, which is the current economic policy employed by the government, is not 
one of them. Manison and Savvides (2017) have shown in a recent article published in 
World Economics Journal that the observed high spending patterns in Cyprus is 
temporary and the result of dissaving in order to defend/maintain living standards. It 
is however, inevitable that savings will eventually be exhausted and that forced 
savings will be needed to pay-down debt, resulting in the full and long-term effects of 
a balance sheet recession. 
The most obvious course of action would be “debt reduction”. Accumulated debt 
depresses consumer demand and inhibits new investment. Debt reduction (or debt 
forgiveness), however, is easier said than done. Especially when policymakers adopt 
the mantra that “a debt is a debt and it is always paid” no matter how big and how 
long it takes or even how it is paid (such as through the confiscation and liquidation of 
collaterals). Such a strict adherence to austerity which ignores and totally puts aside 
the effects of private debt will however inevitably drag the country further into a crisis 
since the end result of forced debt repayment within a faltering economy is to amplify 
and prolong the recessionary effects (see Hudson, 2012 and Vague, 2014). Iceland, 
for example, declared a state of national emergency, broke up and closed most banks 
and declared the bank debt to foreign entities and bond holders as not repayable in the 
reigning economic conditions. The result was a recovery in a period of less than three 
years. Given that Cyprus is in the Eurozone, however, such a course of action may be 
more difficult, unless of course the country is willing to consider leaving the euro and 
adopting its own currency. 
Without meaning to downplay the negative impact that such a radical recourse would 
cause, particularly its adverse effects on the balance of payments of the country, in 
such dire circumstances some control of inflation and devaluation of the currency can 
do more good than harm. In real terms, the debts to the banks, which are mostly 
foreign owned, will fall significantly, thereby lowering the hurdle of repayment and 
having a similar effect as debt reduction on Cypriot borrowers. Moreover, the assets 
which are held as collateral by the banks will increase in value relative to outstanding 
loan balances and therefore give better security coverage for the banks and reduce the 
need for higher provisions. Despite the adverse effects and initial hardship, it should 
be noted that such a path can potentially lead towards the necessary adjustment for the 
repair and reconstruction of the economy. 
Given Cyprus’ position in the Eurozone and its political tight spot, one can understand 
not following an Icelandic type of solution. But its predicament does not allow the 
Government the comfort to do nothing and pretend that everything is fine or even that 
Cyprus is an economic miracle, as some politicians would have us believe. This is 
why there is a crying need for policies to improve the macroeconomic environment 
designed carefully to address the balance sheet recession problem and specific private 
debt issues. The Government should not make the mistake of concentrating all its 
efforts in reducing the amount and cost of public debt, but rather use fiscal policy to 
lesson and repair the effects of private debt on the economy. The aim should thus be 
to stimulate the economy through public and private sector projects carefully selected 
and financed by creating new business entities (special purpose vehicles) unburdened 
by existing debts. This would, among other things, entail the creation of a special 
Development Finance Bank or Agency which will be mandated through legislation to 
evaluate and vet all major public sector capital expenditure and also ensure that 
public-private-partnerships are viable and in the public interest (Savvides, 2016). 
Given the huge private debt, the risk of a long and enduring recession is very high 
because of the compelling need for households and corporations to repair their 
balance sheets. In a recent statement by the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus 
during the presentation of the CBC’s Annual Report, it was admitted for the first time 
that the non-performing loans problem will need another 10 years to be brought to 
manageable levels. Judging from the experiences of countries whose private debt was 
in fact significantly lower than that of Cyprus, such as Japan, the period could be well 
in excess of 10 years. 
What policymakers do not say, or perhaps even realise themselves, however, is that a 
long and deep recession will result from doing nothing and staying the course of strict 
austerity. Rather than staring blissfully down the abyss, the government should stand 
ready to have in place the institutions and provide for fiscal measures which will 
mitigate and cushion the deflationary effects of the coming, but very foreseeable, 
recession. To quote Richard Vague (2014), “Government Debt Isn't the Problem-
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